This paper aims at providing an explanation of the observed espresso price dispersion across major Italian cities. The empirical evidence suggests a positive relationships between the average espresso price in a city and the number of co¤ee shops (normalized for the adult population) operating in that city. This …nding is shown to be robust after controlling for GDP per capita and consumers'price index. We provide an interpretation of the empirical …ndings relying on a model of price competition delivering a continuum of Nash equilibria, where …rms adjust the mark-up to o¤set the negative e¤ect of any increase in their number.
Introduction
For the average Italian adult, drinking an espresso is not only a ritual, but it is most often a repeated ritual during the day. According to anecdotical evidence, espresso is the second most drunk beverage in Italy (water being …rst), dozens million cups being consumed daily.
A discerning consumer travelling from Northern to Southern Italian cities would probably notice a non-negligible fall in espresso prices. Actually, in major Italian cities espresso cups are priced in bars very similarly within cities and very di¤erently across cities. 1 For instance, in 2001 the average price 2 charged in Milano was 0.78 euros, it declines to 0.62 in Roma and even more in Palermo, 0.56. In 2011, the last year in our sample, the dispersion across cities did not change much as it ranged from 1.01 euros in Bologna to 0.79 in Roma and 0.71 in Bari.
Since the standard espresso drunk at the bar is a fairly homogeneous good, except for location, broad price di¤erences look surprising. Moreover, descriptives suggest a large variance in the average number of consumers per bar across cities. In particular, it turns out that higher prices are associated to lower number of clients (proxied by adult inhabitants) per bar. These facts give rise to interesting questions: why prices are so high in some cities and not in others? do consumers per bar play a role in explaining these large 1 In what follows we refer to "bar"to indicate a plethora of establishments selling co¤ee (co¤ee shops, cafeterias, pubs. . . ), excluding restaurants. More details are provided in Appendix A.1 describing the dataset. 2 By average price we mean the price charged for a cup of single espresso drunk standing at the counter. Unlike many other countries, this is the standard way Italians consume espresso. Hence, the sample excludes the service surcharge applied by cafeterias to the price of espresso when customers sit down.
di¤erences in prices? High levels of price are compatible with several di¤er-ent explanations. The …rst and well known relies upon explicit collusion. 3 A second interpretation may be based on tacit collusion in a repeated game.
However, there are at least two characteristics of the espresso market that are hardly compatible with the two above classical explanations. First, the number of bars/…rms is large in all cities. Second, in many cities demand is seasonally ‡uctuating because of tourists' ‡ows and the discontinuous presence of students. Both factors are known as obstacles to implement and sustain collusive agreements.
However, there is a third approach that does not need to invoke either implicit or explicit collusion. Such an approach is based upon Dastidar's 2 Empirical analysis
Data
We aim to perform an empirical analysis on the distribution of espresso prices in Italy. The lack of data available on the sector studied constitutes an important constraint to our analysis. In Appendix A.1 we provide a detailed account of how we constructed the sample. Generally, our analysis Table 1 . 
Empirical results
Observing the raw data we detect the presence of a negative relationship between the price of the espresso and the average number of clients per bar.
The scatter plot of clients per bar and espresso prices displays a downward pattern that approaches the average price of 1 euro when clients per bar are less than 400. The relationship is con…rmed by the correlation coe¢ cient of 0:6292. 4 The total adult population is o¢ cially de…ned by ISTAT as residents of 15 years of age or above. The previous descriptive evidence is not su¢ cient to explain the observed pattern of espresso prices in Italy. For a better understanding of the price dispersion, we need at least to control for a number of other factors. In particular, price dispersion is likely to be explained by variables like cities'GDP per capita and general consumers'price indices. Common sense would suggest that richer cities should experience higher price levels, including higher espresso prices.
5
Given the panel structure of our dataset, we estimate a Linear Probability
Model with Fixed E¤ects using the following speci…cation:
where t indicates the year, i the city and it represents the city …xed e¤ects.
For ease of interpretation of the following results, the variable Clients is measured in hundred clients per bar and GDPpc in thousands of euros.
5 Intuition may suggest that richer areas entail higher espresso prices. However, this maybe misleading: within the same city, for example Bologna, espresso prices are basically ‡at across districts, despite very large di¤erences in income per capita across city districts (Bologna City Council, 2014). First and fairly surprisingly, city consumers' price levels are not statistically signi…cant in explaining espresso prices. 6 Whereas we could a priori think that the price index may capture, for example, the impact of tourism on the price of an espresso cup, our regression analysis suggests instead no role for this regressor. Second, the GDP per capita has a statistically signi…cant role in explaining the espresso price dispersion. A thousand euros increase in the GDP per capita has an estimated positive impact of 2 cents on the price of a cup. Last but not least, controlling for …xed e¤ects, evidence
shows that increasing the average number of clients per bar has a signi…cant and negative e¤ect on the price of espresso. In particular, an extra hundred clients per each bar is estimated to lead to an average decrease of 6.2 cents in 6 We included both GDP per capita and consumers'price levels among the regressors as they are not highly collinear.
the price of espresso. 7 The latter …nding is rather counterintuitive. There are two ways of thinking about it: either increasing demand per bar yields a fall in espresso prices or increasing the number of sellers for a given population of consumers increases espresso prices. This …nding calls for a theoretical investigation.
A suggested interpretation
To rationalize our empirical …ndings, we rely upon Dastidar (1995) . His model is important for the analysis of market competition under price-setting behavior because it allows proving the existence of a continuum of purestrategy Nash equilibria in the price space under regular demand and convex variable costs. We shall focus on a linear-quadratic version of his original model.
The market is supplied by a population of n 1 identical …rms. The product is homogeneous and its demand function is p = a Q; where Q = n i=1 q i is aggregate output p is price and a is a positive parameter proxying the size of the market. All …rms produce with the same technology, to which a cost function C i = bq i +cq 2 i =2 is associated, where c is a positive parameter, and b 2 [0; a). The pro…t function of …rm i is then
where
The non-cooperative one-shot game takes place under complete, symmetric and imperfect information. The solution concept is the Nash equilibrium, which here involves all …rms setting the same price p 2 [p avc ; p u ] : At the lower bound p avc ; equilibrium price equals average variable costs, so that …rms are indi¤erent between producing or not. At the upper bound p u ; the equilibrium price is such that …rms would be indi¤erent between playing p u or marginally undercutting it in order to capture the entire market demand.
The continuum of price equilibria is
where BN stands for Bertrand-Nash, and is a parameter whose range is
In particular: if = 0; the equilibrium price equals average variable cost; at = n=2; marginal cost pricing obtains; if = n 2 = (1 + n) ; p BN reaches the highest level above which undercutting takes place.
Taking the partial derivatives of (3) w.r.t. n (treated as a continuous variable) and , we get
The partial derivative (4) tells that, in the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, an increase in the number of …rms unambiguously decrease market price. Partial derivative (5) reveals that the equilibrium price increases with at the same rate with which price decreases w.r.t. the number of …rms. Therefore, the isoprice curve in the space (n; ) is a straight line increasing at 45 . This amounts to saying that the price-setting …rms may compensate the negative e¤ect of an increase in their number by increasing : If the latter increases more than proportionately w.r.t. n, the equilibrium price increases.
Bridging evidence and theory
In our context, the assumption of cost convexity appears a sound one. Indeed, according to a recent professional association report (FIPE, 2013) , in the average Italian bar, labor costs account for about 60% of the total espresso cost, whereas raw co¤ee weights 22% and rents and other costs account for 18%. Hence, the incidence of labor costs makes the hypothesis of convex variable costs plausible. Moreover, di¤erent rents likely account for the midl dispersion of espresso prices within each city.
Our linear probability model with …xed e¤ects explains espresso prices using three variables: GDP per capita, consumers'price level and the average number of clients per bar. As for the GDP, it clearly a¤ects positively the espresso price. In our formulation of Dastidar's model, GDP is proxied by parameter a; any increase in which obviously causes an increase in equilibrium price. The e¤ect of a change in the consumers' price level, which could perhaps be captured by a variation in the cost parameters b and c appearing in the cost function, is not statistically signi…cant.
Finally, notice that a decrease in the average number of clients per bar is equivalent to an increase in the number of bars for any given size of consumers'population. The empirical …nding is that an increase in the number of bars (…rms) signi…cantly increases espresso prices. The theoretical counterpart of this …nding is that …rms react to the pro-competitive impact of an In other words, the data-generation process relies upon the conjecture that the number of bars were not subject to any technological, demand or supply shock in the ten years time span considered: given the characteristics of the sector (very homogeneous product, very low technology, very customary clients) our conjecture and the resulting constant rate appears justi…ed. 
A.2 Robustness checks
In the light of the di¢ culties faced in constructing the dataset for the analysis, it is extremely important to check the robustness of them. To do so, in this section we test two alternative speci…cations. The …rst speci…cation includes (1) and (2) respectively. Column (1) shows that our results are extremely robust to the …rst of our new, reduced speci…cations. On top of that the correlation coe¢ cient between these two variables is still 0:6262. The regression results in (2), instead, might be a¤ected by the reduced number of observations when focusing only on two years. 
